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While the Court does not dispute that at first blush the defendant's 
argument appears logical, it is disturbed by the prospect of how 
one determines the point at which the number of aggravating 
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include in the formula? Can the Court arbitrarily declare that  fifty 
aggravating circumstances is too many but forty-nine is permissible? 
Even assuming one could create a tool that would measure the 
percentage of defendants eligible for capital punishment, where is 
the dividing line of constitutionality and who makes that decision? 1 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to use the death penalty, states must have "genuinely 
narrowed" 2 the class of people eligible for death to the so-called "worst 
of the worst."3 To do this (in a strategy blessed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in its Gregg+ and Jureh5 cases), juries must find certain 
"aggravating factors" that ostensibly prove that this crime and this 
criminal were among the offenders most deserving of death.6 Death 
penalty opponents have developed two strategies, one old and one 
relatively recent, to attack the various aggravating factors employed by 
the states. The first strategy requires showing that some aggravating 
factors are so wide-open and amorphous that they do not genuinely 
limit who can get the death penalty. For example, factors like a 
murder being "inhumane" or "depraved" do not narrow the class of 
murderers eligible for the death penalty because arguably all murders 
1 State v. Steckel, 708 A.2d 994, 1000 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1996); see also Chelsea Creo 
Sharon, Note, The "Most Deserving" of Deatl1: The Narrowing Requirement and the 
Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 223, 239-42 (2011). 
1 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983) ("To avoid this constitutional flaw, 
an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for 
the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe 
sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."). 
3 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter,]., dissenting) ("[W]ithin 
the category of capital crimes, the death penalty must be reserved for 'the worst of the 
worst."'); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446-47, as modified (Oct. 1, 
2008), opinion modified on denial of reh'g, 554 U.S. 945 (2008) ("The rule of evolving 
standards of decency with specific marks on the way to full progress and mature 
judgment means that resort to the penalty must be reserved for the worst of crimes 
and limited in its instances of application."). 
  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
s Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). 
6 See Jurek, 428 U.S. at 270 (approving statutory scheme that "in essence" 
required "the jury [to] find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance 
before the death penalty may be imposed"); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197 (approving a 
system of aggravating circumstances, which "require[d] the jury to consider the 
circumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recommends sentence"). 
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are inhumane and depraved.7 In the Godfrey case, the Court endorsed 
this strategy and required states to put limiting construction on these 
overbroad aggravating factors.8 
According to the more recent - and high-profile9 - strategy, death 
penalty abolitionists argue that a single overly broad aggravating factor 
could also be present when a state has too many aggravating factors. 10 
This argument was set forth in the recent petition for the writ of 
certiorari in Hidalgo v. Aiizona. 11 Arizona has fourteen aggravating 
7 This objection was raised in the Gregg litigation, but the Court deferred 
consideration of it. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 201 (finding "no reason" to assume the 
Georgia Supreme Court would adopt "open-ended" constructions of certain 
aggravating factors). But see Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432 (1980) (faulting 
the Georgia Supreme Court for not giving a limiting construction to a sentencing 
factor that found aggravation if the murder was "outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible and inhuman" or showed "depravity of mind"). 
B See id. The general rule for these types of cases was summarized by the Court in 
Walton v. Arizona: 
When a federal court is asked to review a state court's application of an 
individual statutory aggravating or mitigating circumstance in a particular 
case, it must first determine whether the statutory language defining the 
circumstance is itself too vague to provide any guidance to the sentencer. If 
so, then the federal court must attempt to determine whether the state courts 
have further defined the vague terms, and if they have done so, whether 
those definitions are constitutionally sufficient, i.e., whether they provide 
some guidance to the sentencer. 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639,654 (1990) (emphasis in original). 
9 See Chris Geidner, A Top Lawyer Has Aslied the Supreme Court to Hear a Major 
Death Penalty Case, BuzzFEED NEWS (Aug. 15, 2017, 6:10 AM), www.buzzfeed.com/ 
chrisgeidner/a-top-lawyer-asks-the-supreme-court-to-hear-a-case-to-end (noting Neal 
Katyal's role in the Hidalgo cert. petition); see also Charles Fain Lehman, Former Obama 
Acting Solicitor General Files SCOTUS Challenge to Death Penalty Constitutionality, WASH. 
FREE BEACON (Aug. 16, 2017, 2:30 PM), www.freebeacon.com/issues/fonner-obama-
solicitor-general-scotus-challenge-death-penalty (same); Ryan Lovelace, Former Obama 
Attorney Asks Supreme Court to Hear New Death Penalty Challenge, WASH. EXAMINER 
(Aug. 15, 2017, 11:36 AM), www.washingtonexaminer.com/fonner-obama-attorney-
asks-supreme-court-to-hear-new-death-penalty-challenge/article-2631552 (same). Several 
amici have already submitted in support of the Hidalgo petition. See Hidalgo v. Arizona, 
Pending Petition, SCOTUSBLOG, www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/hidalgo-v-arizona 
(accessed Sept. 22, 2017). 
10 Although not the precise argument advanced in Hidalgo, the strategy was also hinted 
at in an important law review note from 2011. See Sharon, supra note 1, at 242-45. 
11 See id.; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Hidalgo v. Arizona, No. 17-251 
(U.S. Aug. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 3531089 (U.S.) [hereinafter Petition for a Writ of 
Cert.). For the Arizona Supreme Court's decision, see Arizona v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 
783 (2017). 
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factors 12 and, what is more important, almost every murder in Arizona 
involves one or more of the fourteen aggravating factors. 13 The 
petitioners contend that the aggravating factors taken as a whole 
cannot serve any narrowing function in limiting the class of those who 
are eligible for the death penalty.14 In other words, having too many 
aggravating factors can be as ineffective as having no aggravating 
factors or having a vague and amorphous aggravating factor. If 
everyone who commits murder becomes eligible, the process fails to 
select the very worst among the generic class of murderers for the 
death penalty. 15 If everyone is the worst, given the scheme as a whole, 
then no one really is. 
While the argument in the Hidalgo petition is superficially 
appealing, it involves a basic mistake. The petition confuses the 
empirical scope of a set of aggravators with the conceptual scope. The 
empirical scope of a set of aggravators covers the total number of 
murders actually committed that fall under one of the aggravators. But 
the conceptual scope goes to how many murders in principle are 
covered under a set of aggravators. The Court's death penalty 
jurisprudence, on my understanding, requires conceptual but not 
empirical narrowing. For the fact that a list of aggravating factors may 
fit every murder committed in a state for a given time period does not 
mean that the aggravating factors are not doing any narrowing work. 
After all, a state could have one very specific aggravating factor that fit 
all of the murders in that state for that year. Yet this does not allow us 
to conclude that the aggravating factor fails to limit in principle the 
class of those that are death penalty eligible. What is required is not 
just an empirical check on who is getting the death penalty given the 
aggravating factors (which is what the Hidalgo petition primarily relies 
on) but an actual conceptual investigation of the particular 
aggravating factors. But then, we are back to the first strategy - attack 
12 See ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 13-751(F) (2017). 
13 Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 3 ('"[V]irtually every' person -
around 99% - convicted of first-degree murder is eligible for the death penalty."); id. 
at 7 (« In other words, 99% of first-degree murders [in Arizona] were eligible for the 
death penalty."); see also id. at 6 ("In support of his motion, Hidalgo submitted 
evidence demonstrating that virtually every first-degree murder committed in 2010 or 
2011 in Maricopa County - where he was tried - had at least one aggravating factor 
present."). 
14 See id. at 10-12. 
1s See id. at 12 ("Petitioner in this case set out evidence demonstrating that the 
aggravating circumstances serve no narrowing function at all because 'virtually every 
first-degree murder case in Arizona presents facts that could support at least one of 
the legislature's aggravating circumstances."'). 
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certain aggravating factors as too broad based on what murders they 
conceptually cover. 
My paper proceeds in three short parts. The first part sets out the 
argument in the Hidalgo petition and explains its claim that having too 
many aggravating factors is as ineffective as having no aggravating 
factors. The second part provides a straightforward critique of the 
Hidalgo argument along the lines detailed above - that the fact that 
aggravating factors may cover a large number of actual murders does 
not say much (indeed, practically nothing in the abstract) about 
whether those aggravating factors "narrow" the class of the death 
eligible. In the third part, I suggest that the "multiple aggravators" 
argument is in essence a version of the original worry about broad and 
amorphous aggravating factors. But this critique means analyzing how 
aggravators work (individually and together) as a conceptual matter, 
rather than analyzing whether all murders committed in the state 
happen to fit under one of the aggravating factors. 
I. THE ARGUMENT IN THE HIDALGO CERT. PETITION 
Appreciating the intuitive force of the argument in the Hidalgo 
petition means looking back to both Furman and Gregg: Furman to 
appreciate the nature of the problem of arbitrariness and Gregg to 
determine what the Supreme Court at the time thought was an 
adequate response to the arbitrariness problem. Furman, 16 especially 
the concurring opinion by Justice Stewart, 17 pointed to what several 
Justices saw as a fundamental flaw in the death penalty in America -
it failed to adequately pick out who, among those who committed 
serious crimes, should receive the death penalty. 18 To be sure, the 
problem at the time of Furman was fairly acute. In the 1970s, the 
death penalty could be given for rapists, for minor participants in 
felony murders, and even for burglars. Moreover, those under sixteen 
years old and the seriously mentally disabled were also death 
eligible. 19 Accordingly, a burglar who was seventeen on one hand and 
16 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
11 See id. at 306-10. 
18 See id. at 309-10 ("For, of all the people convicted ofrapes and murders in 1967 
and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact 
been imposed.") (footnote omitted). 
19 See Carol S. Steiker &: Jordan M. Steiker, Part II: Report to the ALI Concerning 
Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 376 (2010) ("[T)he Supreme Court . . .  has 
limited capital punishment to the crime of murder, in comparison to the pre-
Furman world in which death sentences for rape, armed robbery, burglary and 
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an adult mass murderer on the other hand could be among the class of 
the death eligible. The former could get death while the latter could 
get life, all based on nothing more than the jury's untutored sense of 
who was "worse." Justice Stewart and others found this possibility 
intolerable because this left the selection process for the death penalty 
(at least in theory) to chance rather than function of the awfulness of 
the crime and the depravity of the criminal.2° To be sure, the death-
eligible class was not limitless - even then only those who committed 
a fairly serious crime were considered. But it was not all that limited. 
Worse, the next narrowing step followed no logic. As the Court would 
put it later, at the stage of picking who among the death eligible 
should actually die, the discretion of the jury was hardly 
"channeled." 21 
In Gregg, however, it appeared that the arbitrariness associated with 
giving juries discretion over death was not beyond repair (something 
that had been hinted at just a few years earlier in the Court's 
McGautha opinion 22). In fact, the cure was a relatively simple formula: 
agree on "aggravating factors" for the juries to review, have the juries 
weigh those against possible mitigating factors, and then institute 
some form of appellate review. If states passed a "carefully drafted 
statute" that "ensure[d] that the sentencing authority" was "given 
adequate information and guidance" then the arbitrariness worry 
could be kept at bay. 23 
kidnapping were authorized and more than occasionally imposed. The Court recently 
has categorically excluded juveniles and offenders with mental retardation from the 
ambit of the death penalty.") (footnote omitted). 
20 Stewart famously compared it to the odds of being struck by lightning. See id. at 309. 
21 See, e.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244 (1988) ("The use of 
'aggravating circumstances' is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing 
the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the jury's discretion."). 
22 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971). McGautlta had concluded that 
channeling jury discretion was a hopeless endeavor: 
To identify before the fact those characteristics of criminal homicides and 
their perpetrators which call for the death penalty, and to express these 
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by 
the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present 
human ability. 
Id. at 204. 
23 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 1S3, 19S (1976). The full quotation reads: 
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not 
be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully 
drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given 
adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these 
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There were some catches, however. The most relevant of which (for 
our purposes) was that if the aggravating factor was not narrow 
enough, it required further limiting construction. A statute that 
allowed the death penalty for every "heinous" murder would not 
channel the jury's discretion because any murder could fit under the 
category of being heinous, at least if "heinousness" was not carefully 
circumscribed. The purpose of having aggravators was to limit 
discretion, not to provide a mechanism for it. The Court flagged the 
issue in Gregg, and noted also the solution. If a particular aggravating 
factor was too "vague" or "broad," then the state courts must provide a 
limiting construction to use the aggravator. If the state court failed to 
do so, any death penalty sentence based on that factor risked being 
reversed. 24 
From this basis in Gregg, the Hidalgo petition gets its foothold. 
According to Gregg, an aggravating factor by itself could fail to limit 
those eligible for the death penalty, and later cases affirmed this 
proposition. But so too, runs the argument in the Hidalgo petition, 
could a sentencing scheme that has too many aggravators. If every 
murder that comes down the pipe fits any of the many aggravating 
factors the state has set up, then every murderer becomes eligible for 
death. 25 It is the broad and vague aggravator problem in a slightly 
different guise. The problem with a broad aggravator is that any 
murder can fit it and thus it serves no limiting function. 26 Similarly, a 
long list of aggravating factors also fails to limit discretion if every 
murder can be matched up with at least one of the aggravating factors. 
Id. 
concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding 
at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to 
the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of 
the information. 
24 See id. at 201. 
25 See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 16 ("Thus, by the State's 
own lights, the constitutionality of Arizona's sentencing scheme turns on whether the 
aggravating circumstances 'impose statutory limits on capital sentencing discretion.' 
Petitioner has demonstrated that they do not. Instead, they render 'virtually every' 
defendant death eligible . . . .  "). 
26 See, e.g., Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S.  463, 474 (1993) ("If the sentencer fairly 
could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to eve,y defendant eligible 
for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.") (emphasis in 
original). I return to this passage later in the paper. See infra note 33 and 
accompanying text. 
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This, according to petitioners, is what happens in Arizona.27 
According to the petition, ninety-nine percent of the murders 
committed in Arizona fit one or more of the fourteen aggravating 
factors in the state's death penalty statute.28 But if all murders are 
moved into the category of "murders eligible for the death penalty," 
then the scheme - taken as a whole rather than in regards to one 
individual aggravator - fails to genuinely narrow. 29 In other words, 
under this sentencing scheme, all murderers in the state end up 
deserving the death penalty. And this starts to look like the 
fundamental flaw in Funnan.Jo 
II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE HIDALGO CERT. PETITION 
Although seemingly compelling, the argument in the Hidalgo 
petition suffers from a basic confusion about the role of aggravators in 
limiting the class of those eligible for death. Consider a simple, and 
admittedly hypothetical, sentencing scheme in the State of "Alpha." 
Alpha's death penalty statute has only two aggravating factors. The 
first aggravator is that the murder is of more than twenty-seven 
people. The second aggravator is that the murder must have been 
preceded by at least three weeks of torture and severe psychological 
abuse of the victim. Suppose that all sixty-eight3 1 of the murders that 
take place within the State of Alpha are precisely these two types. 
Here, just like the situation in Arizona, the aggravators are not 
genuinely narrowing criminals eligible for death. All sixty-eight 
murders - one hundred percent - are covered by one of the two 
aggravators. The same objection lodged in the Hidalgo petition would 
seem to apply: the aggravators are not performing any real narrowing 
work because it turns out that all murders in the State of Alpha are 
21 See Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 12 ("The Arizona Supreme 
Court has disregarded that bedrock requirement of the Eighth Amendment, upholding 
the constitutionality of a capital punishment scheme that renders 'virtually every' 
defendant convicted of first-degree murder eligible for the death penalty."). 
28 Id. at 3. 
29 See id. at 12 ("Petitioner in this case set out evidence demonstrating that the 
aggravating circumstances serve no narrowing function at all because 'virtually every 
first degree murder case in Arizona presents facts that could support at least one of the 
legislature's aggravating circumstances."'). 
JO See id. at 12-13 ("That holding [that Arizona's scheme is constitutional) is 
plainly incompatible with this Court's insistence that a statutory scheme must limit 
the class of death-eligible defendants.") (emphasis in original). 
31 It does not really matter how many murders there were, but let us say there 
were sixty-eight. 
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death eligible. According to the Hidalgo petition, the State of Alpha's 
sentencing scheme should be unconstitutional. 
This is an absurd result, and it is a function of the fact that the 
"narrowing" requirement is capable of two interpretations; one of 
which is more plausible than the other. The Hidalgo petition trades on 
this ambiguity by presenting the weaker reading of this requirement as 
the correct one. For example, the Supreme Court has stated that an 
"aggravating circumstance may not apply to every defendant convicted 
of murder." Rather, "it must apply only to a subclass of defendants 
convicted of murder. "32 Applied to a scheme as a whole, this would be 
problematic if a scheme had a list of aggravators that applied to "every 
defendant convicted of a murder. "33 Or consider what the Court said 
in Arave regarding when an aggravating circumstance would not pass 
a constitutional muster: "If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an 
aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the 
death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm. "34 Reading 
this passage, one might conclude that if a list of aggravators applied to 
every defendant eligible for the death penalty, then taken as a whole 
that list would be "constitutionally infirm" as well. 
Under the weak reading of the narrowing requirement, the class of 
the death eligible is sufficiently "narrowed" when the number of 
death-eligible murderers is less than the total number of murderers in 
the state. I will call this weak reading an "empirical" reading of the 
narrowing requirement. This empirical reading interprets the 
narrowing requirement as a matter of sheer numbers. Applying this to 
the State of Alpha example, if the number of those who are death 
eligible is the same as all murders, then no real narrowing work has 
been done by the set of aggravators. That is, the State of Alpha's 
scheme fails because the number of murderers eligible for death and 
the total number of murderers are the same. As no empirical or 
numerical narrowing has been done, according to the Hidalgo petition, 
this scheme would be unconstitutional. 
A better reading of the narrowing requirement, however, would find 
the State of Alpha's scheme constitutional. As a conceptual matter, the 
number of possible murderers that are death eligible are in fact 
narrowed down, and quite considerably. I will call this reading the 
"conceptual" reading because as a conceptual matter not all alleged 
murderers in Alpha are in fact eligible for the death penalty. Applying 
32 Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994) (citing Arave v. Creech, 507 
U.S. 463,474 (1993)). 
33 Cd. 
34 Arave, 507 U.S. at 474 (emphasis in original). 
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the State of Alpha example, if you shoot just two people without 
torturing them, and even if you shoot more than five people whom 
you torture for five days, you are not eligible for the death penalty in 
Alpha. The class of murderers eligible for death in theory is quite 
small in Alpha. It just so happens that Alpha has gone through a 
terrible stretch, where all the murders have been of an especially 
gruesome sort. As it turns out, the class of murderers and the class of 
death-eligible murderers are coextensive. But relying on the empirical 
number says nothing about whether real narrowing has occurred at the 
conceptual level because it would seem obvious that it has occurred. 
The argument raised in the Hidalgo petition ignores this possibility, 
or at least glosses over it. Under the narrowing requirement in the 
context of Gregg and its progeny, states must provide a sound basis to 
categorize certain murders as worse than others.35 This differs from 
what the Hidalgo petitioners argue. While they show that in parts of 
Arizona, every murder that happened fits one of the aggravated 
factors, this does not mean that no narrowing has been done by that 
state's aggravators. It could be, after all, that we are living in a state 
like the State of Alpha, where all two of the aggravators are providing a 
conceptual basis for narrowing the class of death-eligible murderers, 
even when all actual murders fit those two aggravators.36 
J5 The Arave passage in context says this: 
If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance 
applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is 
constitutionally infirm. See Cartw1ight, supra, 486 U.S., at 364, 108 S.Ct., at 
1859 (invalidating aggravating circumstance that "an ordinary person could 
honestly believe" described every murder); Godfrey, supra, 446 U.S., at 428-
429, 100 S.Ct., at 1765 ("A person of ordinary sensibility could fairly 
characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible 
and inhuman" ' ). 
Id. Note how the requirement is that the aggravator in principle describe every murder, 
not just that it describe every person who has murdered in that state. 
J6 Moreover, I take it that the narrowing requirement would rule out - and I am 
indebted to Stephen Galoob for this point - a scheme which "narrowed" the number 
of death eligible by some principle such as "every seventh murderer is death eligible" 
or "every murderer who kills on Tuesdays" is death eligible. These aggravators would 
narrow, but not in a rational way. I am assuming that the State of Alpha's scheme 
meets this test of rational narrowing: it may be extreme, but we should not doubt 
either that multiple murders or torturing before murder would make a murder 
distinguishable from the mine-run of murders. 
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l l l .  THE WAY FORWARD 
The Hidalgo petition ironically comes close to realizing the 
confusion I have just identified when it gives an example similar to the 
one about the State of Alpha. 37 In response to the Arizona Supreme 
Court's opinion in Hidalgo that it was enough that the individual 
aggravators applied to "fewer than all murders," the petition argues 
that, "under that logic, a State would be free to adopt two aggravators: 
one that covers all murders with a particular feature, and the other 
that covers all murders that lacll the particular feature. "38 This, indeed, 
is a variation on the State of Alpha example, but obviously with one 
important difference - the State of Alpha's aggravators seemed to 
cover only a very small class of murders. It just turned out that all the 
murders in Alpha that year happened to fit into that small class. Thus, 
the aggravators conceptually but not numerically narrowed the death-
eligible murderers. On the other hand, two aggravators in the Hidalgo 
petition's example conceptually cover all murders. But this argument 
differs from the claim that all murderers fit under one of Arizona's 
aggravating factors.39 Instead, the Hidalgo petition example suggests 
that the aggravators in A1izona are so broad that they conceptually 
"cover the field," meaning they encompass all possible murders.40 
A state like the one imagined in the petitioner's brief - which had 
two aggravators that covered the field of all possible murders - would 
likely have a problem under Godfrey. It is the same problem of having 
a vague and overbroad aggravator, but divided in two. Each aggravator 
would be too broad on its own. Further, if they, when taken together, 
37 See supra Part 11. 
38 Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 11, at 14-15 (emphasis in original). 
39 This is true despite what the Petition seems to suggest, as in this passage: 
But under that logic, a State would be free to adopt two aggravators: one that 
covers all murders with a particular feature, and the other that covers all 
murders that lack the particular feature. Or - as Arizona has done here - it 
could adopt a long list of aggravators such that every convicted murderer is 
somehow made eligible for death. Either system utterly fails to offer a 
meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which death is imposed 
from the many cases in which it is not. 
Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)). 
 o For example, you could imagine distinct aggravators for murders that involved
the killing of: (1) police officers, (2) firefighters, (3) judges, and ( 4) potential 
witnesses. These would all pick out murders that are distinct from so-called 
"ordinary" murders, but unless we had a statute that picked out eve1y type of 
employment (and unemployment), the class of the death-eligible would not become 
coextensive with the class of all murderers. 
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covered conceptually all possible murders, then the whole scheme 
would certainly have a problem under Gregg and related cases.41 
But the Hidalgo petition has failed to show that the many 
aggravating factors in Arizona add up to something that "covers the 
field" and makes all murderers, as a conceptual matter, eligible for 
death. Instead, it engages in the weak, or empirical, reading of the 
narrowing requirement that I noted above: because all murders match 
an aggravator, all murderers are eligible for death. This is true as a 
matter of empirical fact, but not as a conceptual truth. The conceptual 
truth requires us to look at what the aggravators do individually. Only 
then can we see whether, when taken altogether, they cover the field 
of all possible murders and the scheme as a whole serves a narrowing 
function. I am skeptical that this latter possibility is actually the case 
in Arizona, or anywhere else. One could imagine a scheme that has 
hundreds of aggravators, but that still comes nowhere close to 
covering the field for all possible murders.42 
Running a successful and sound Hidalgo-type argument would not 
involve any empirical investigation as to how many murders fell under 
the existing aggravating factors. This is not the limiting function that 
the Court has indicated it requires of aggravating factors. And as the 
State of Alpha hy p othetical shows, it should strike us as clearly the 
wrong kind of limiting. The scheme could conceptually limit the 
death-eligible murders to a great degree without empirically narrowing 
the number of the murders. 
By contrast, a successful and sound Hidalgo-ty p e argument would 
build on Godfrey, not depart from it. It would look at the aggravators 
arid see, when taken together, whether they conceptually include all 
murders. Suppose a scheme had an aggravator that included murders 
"out in the open" and suppose it also had an aggravator that included 
"concealed" killings. 43 Here, we have a facially plausible claim that the 
41 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976) (stating that the Court will look 
at the "sentencing system as a whole"); see also Petition for a Writ of Cert., supra note 
11, at 15 (calling this approach "holistic"). This is one definite contribution of the 
petition, in that it urges a look at how the aggravators work together. My concern is 
that the petition does not go far enough in showing a real constitutional problem with 
these schemes when taken as a whole. 
42 Again, this shows why we cannot simply say in the abstract that there are too 
many aggravators without looking to see what those aggravators cover. Without looking 
at the content of the aggravators, we  are left with the question raised in the quotation that 
opens my essay, viz., when we  get to the point of "too many aggravators." I return to this 
point in my conclusion. See also supra example in note 40. 
43 I owe this example to Joe Welling. 
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sentencing scheme leaves no murders out.44 This is not a matter of 
empirical fact: we do not need to look at the murders that happened to 
determine if the aggravators would cover all murders. Instead, it is a 
matter of the concepts, now not only scrutinized individually, but also 
taken as a whole.45 
Thus, I propose that to determine if a group of aggravators taken as 
a whole "covers the field," we must first look at the aggravators one by 
one to see if each factor is too broad, and then take them together to 
see if it conceptually narrows the class of those eligible for death. 
When taken as a whole, courts must consider whether they narrow the 
class of murderers who are death eligible beyond the "ordinary" 
murder, not whether the aggravators in fact cover all the murders for a 
given period of time. As the Court has made clear, "ordinary" is not 
defined statistically, but conceptually as a murder that only involves 
+! Justice Blackmun attempts just such an argument about the California death 
penalty sentencing scheme in his dissent in Tuilaepa (which I quote at length): 
Prosecutors have argued, and jurors are free to find, that "circumstances of 
the crime" constitutes an aggravating factor because the defendant killed the 
victim for some purportedly aggravating motive, such as money, or because 
the defendant killed the victim for no motive at all; because the defendant 
killed in cold blood, or in hot blood; because the defendant attempted to 
conceal his crime, or made no attempt to conceal it; because the defendant 
made the victim endure the terror of anticipating a violent death, or because 
the defendant killed without any warning; and because the defendant had a 
prior relationship with the victim, or because the victim was a complete 
stranger. Similarly, prosecutors have argued, and juries are free to find, that 
the age of the victim was an aggravating circumstance because the victim 
was a child, an adolescent, a young adult, in the prime of life, or elderly; or 
that the method of killing was aggravating, because the victim was strangled, 
bludgeoned, shot, stabbed, or consumed by fire; or that the location of the 
killing was an aggravating factor, because the victim was killed in her own 
home, in a public bar, in a city park, or in a remote location. 
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 96 7, 986-88 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). I leave 
it open whether Justice Blackmun's argument works (that he correctly describes all 
the aggravators in the scheme, and in fact the aggravators taken together "cover the 
field," etc.). My point only is: it is the right kind of argument. Note that if Justice 
Blackmun is right, it does not matter what kinds of murders are committed in 
California in any given year, or even ever. We just need to look, conceptually, at what 
aggravators there are and how they work together. 
45 Of course, this does not conflict with also pursuing the Godfrey case for 
individual aggravators, viz., that some aggravators are too broad taken by themselves. 
However, the meaning of "broad" is unclear given the limited number of cases on this 
issue, except when the aggravator selects all murders as death eligible. See supra note 
8 and accompanying text. It is also consistent with attacking individual aggravators as 
not picking out a feature that plausibly makes a murder one of the worst of the worst. 
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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the unjustified killing of another person, stripped of any aggravators 
that pick out that killing as special or especially bad.46 
Unconstitutional aggravators will fail to narrow the class of the 
death eligible either individually - this is what happens in the non-
limited version of the "heinous" aggravator - or when taken as a 
whole - this is what might happen if two or more aggravators covered 
the field to include all murders. Both are part of the death penalty 
opponents' original strategy except that the latter applies to the 
scheme as a whole. The upshot of successful argument under either 
strategy is the same. The scheme does not narrow because it fails to 
select those murders that are worse than what all murders share 
conceptually - the unjustified killing of another person. Such a 
scheme would be "constitutionally infirm," not under the novel (and 
flawed) argument in the Hidalgo petition, but under the original 
argument set forth in Godfrey. 
CONCLUSION 
Posed in the abstract, "How many aggravators is too many?" has no 
clear answer. We can, however, identify two possible ways of 
answering this question. First, any aggravator is one too many if that 
aggravator does not narrow the class of death-eligible murderers to 
less than the class of murderers taken as a whole. In other words, a 
state must show how this murderer is worse than every other 
murderer convicted in that state. The Court pointed out this problem 
in Godfrey. Second, any group of aggravators may be found 
unconstitutional if that group makes up a scheme where every 
possible murderer is death eligible. In other words, if any murder 
always has an aggravator that matches it, then the scheme 
conceptually covers all possible murders. 
This second answer is the constitutional problem that the Hidalgo 
petition gestures at, but does not fully establish. For both of these 
kinds of answers, the problem is not ultimately one of numbers. 
Neither case against aggravating factors can be made by merely 
showing that a lot or even all murders in a state matches an 
 6 As the Arizona Supreme Court put it, the idea is to guarantee that "no 
defendant will be subject to a death sentence merely by virtue of being found guilty of 
first degree murder . . . .  " Arizona v. Hidalgo, 390 P.3d 783, 791 (Ariz. 2017); see also 
Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416 (1982) ("The existence of one or more 
aggravating circumstances is a threshold finding that authorizes the jury to consider 
imposing the death penalty; it serves as a bridge that takes the jury from the general 
class of all murders to the narrower class of offenses the state legislature has 
determined warrant the death penalty."). 
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aggravator. The case that an aggravator or a scheme of aggravators is 
too broad and captures too many murderers can only be made by 
looking at what the aggravator or aggravators conceptually cover -
taken singly, or taken as a whole. It is in making this kind of case that 
we might be able to fulfill the promise of the Hidalgo petition. 

